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THE ROLE OF COURTS IN “MAKING” LAW IN JAPAN:  
THE COMMUNITARIAN CONSERVATISM OF 
JAPANESE JUDGES 
John O. Haley† 
Abstract: Professor Haley is an outstanding international and comparative law 
scholars, widely credited with having popularized Japanese legal studies in the United 
States.  In 1969, Haley received a fellowship from the University of Washington and was 
in one of the first classes to graduate from the Asian Law Program, now, the Asian Law 
Center.  After working for several years in law firms in Japan, he joined the law faculty at 
the University of Washington, where he remained for nearly twenty-six years during 
which time he directed the Asian and Comparative Law Program.  In June 2012, 
Professor Haley was awarded The Order of the Rising Sun (3rd Class) from the Emperor 
of Japan for his contribution to the discipline of Japanese law and education to Japanese 
legal professionals and academics.  In honor of this achievement, the University of 
Washington School of Law and the Asian Law Center brought together distinguished 
scholars and Asian Law Center alumni to discuss the judiciary’s increased role in Japan 
and Asia in two conferences.  The following is Professor Haley’s address at the 
University of Waseda, Japan, on October 22nd, 2012.  In this speech, Professor Haley 
provides an overview of the role of legal precedent in Japan, both throughout its history 
and today. 
I. INTRODUCTION  
Courts in Japan have long played a central role in the formation and 
development of law.  Much of the law in Japan has been and continues to be 
judge-made.  Despite some scholarly dissension as to the theory of judicial 
precedent as a source of law, adherence to judicial precedent is well-
established in law and practice, touching nearly all fields of Japanese law.1  
As early as 1922, for example, the title of the official compilation of 
Daishin’in (Great Court of Cassation ) decisions was revised from  a “record 
                                                      
†  As indicated in the cited works, the topic and the related research for this paper reflects the 
author’s personal journey as a legal scholar whose primary focus for over four decades has been Japanese 
law.  That journey began in 1969 as an LL.M. candidate in the Asian Law Program at the University of 
Washington. My master’s research paper itself was a study of the law of secured transactions developed by 
the courts during the first half of the last century.  See JOHN OWEN HALEY, NON-CODE SECURITY 
INTERESTS: A STUDY OF JAPANESE CASE LAW (1971), available at the Gallagher Law Library, University 
of Washington School of Law. 
1  See, e.g., Takeyoshi Kawashima, The Concept of Judicial Precedent in Japanese Law, in IUS 
PRIVATUM GENTIUM: FESTSCHRIFT FÜR MAX RHEINSYTEIN ZUM 70. GEBURTSTAG AM 5. JULI 1969 87-99 
(Ernst von Caemmerer, Soia Mentschikoff, and Konrad Zweigert, eds., 1969). 
 
492 PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL VOL. 22 NO. 3 
 
of judgments” (hanketsuroku) to a “collection of judicial precedents” 
(hanreishū).    
At the outset, however, a fundamental proposition relevant for all 
legal orders needs to be emphasized.  All legal systems adhere to judicial 
precedent to some degree.  Were prior decisions by the highest courts in 
judicial hierarchies devoid of any precedential value, and thus courts below 
and even the highest court could ignore them when confronted with a 
seemingly identical case, judicial decisions would become the arbitrary 
judgments of individual judges.  The result would be an intolerable 
lawlessness that would negate the viability of any legal order.  Even in 
France—notorious for its civil code proscription against judges making 
law—judicial decisions by the Court of Cassation defined the law of delicts 
(tort), introduced the remedy of astrainte, and have consistently filled gaps 
left by codes and statutes.  Moreover, French administrative law is almost 
solely the creation of adjudicatory decisions—i.e., judicial decisions—of the 
Council of State. What makes Japan exceptional is the extent to which the 
courts make law and adhere to precedent.  To this we now turn. 
II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES OF JUDICIAL AND LEGAL PRECEDENT 
A. Warrior Governance and Adjudication  
From the twelfth century, the warrior rulers in Japan relied on 
adjudication as a primary means not only for enforcing legal rules but also 
for maintaining order.  Through the process of adjudication, one of the most 
remarkable developments occurred—the transformation of the concept of 
shiki, which originally denoted an entitlement to imperial office, into a 
transferable proprietary “right” to the revenue for such office.  As I have 
argued, “Shiki were thus conceptually transformed into a novel form of 
intangible, but still contingent property.  This recognition of a transferable 
private claim to such revenues also represented a significant step in the 
development of a private law system.”2  This transformation was essentially 
the product of an adjudicatory process centered in the Bureau of Records 
(Kirokujo).3  The first example of warrior legislation—the “formularies” of 
                                                      
2  John O. Haley, Rivers and Rice: What Lawyers and Legal Historians Should Know about 
Medieval Japan, 36 J. JAPANESE STUD. 313 329-31 (2010).  For a provocative essay on some of the effects 
of this transformation, which enabled rights to produce (rice) not necessarily the land itself to be transferred, 
see Mikael Adolphson & J. Mark Ramseyer, The Competitive Enforcement of Property Rights in Japan: 
The Role of Temples and Monasteries, 71 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 660 (2009). 
3  See Cornelius J. Kiley, The Imperial Court as a Legal Authority in the Kamakura Age, in COURT 
AND BAKUFU IN JAPAN: ESSAYS IN KAMAKURA HISTORY 29 (Jeffrey P. Mass, ed., 1982). 
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the warrior rulers similarly reflected the significance of adjudication—
presaging the role of the courts in modern Japan. 
These formularies encompassed instructions to subordinates and 
future officials responsible for administration and the adjudication of 
disputes among the men-at-arms under bakufu jurisdiction.  The most 
complete set were contained in the fifty-three article Goseibai Shikimoku, 
known in English as the Jōei formulary of 1232, with hundreds of 
supplemental orders.  Its promulgation was an exercise in legitimization of a 
set of rules for the warrior class, with nationwide applicability.  A century 
later, in 1336, the Ashikaga shogun issued a similar formulary, known as the 
the Kenmu Shikimoku, which had a legitimizing function.4  Both contained 
admonitions and commands largely based on precedent and customary 
norms within the warrior community.  Not until the sixteenth century did 
warrior rulers begin to legislate new rules, but even then, many reflected 
well-established judicial precedents.5  
For evidence of the primary role of judicial decisions and precedent in 
the making of legal rules during the subsequent two-and-a-half centuries of 
Tokugawa rule (1603-1867), we need look no further than the multivolume 
series of Tokugawa legal precedents originally collected and published in 
Japanese in 1877 by the Ministry of Justice, under the title Tokugawa Jidai 
Minji Kanrei Ruishū: Tokugawa Saiban Rei (Collection of Civil Customs of 
the Tokugawa Era: Tokugawa Legal Precedents), subsequently translated 
into English and then edited  by John Henry Wigmore under the auspices of 
the Kokusai Bunka Shinkokai.  Although most of the original documents 
were destroyed during the Great Kanto Earthquake of 1923, the complete set 
was finally published by The University of Tokyo Press between 1969 and  
1987.  As manifest in the separate volumes on legal precedents in contract, 
property persons and procedure, judicial precedent was a fundamental 
feature of Japanese private law during the Tokugawa Era.  
B. Meiji Era—Theory Reception and Gap-Filling  
The role of the courts in defining the rules and principles of the civil 
code from its inception in the mid-1890s is also well known.  As Professor 
Zentaro Kitagawa has described so eloquently as a second reception of 
                                                      
4  KENNETH A. GROSSBERG, THE LAWS OF THE MUROMACHI BAKUFU 8 (1981), quoted in JOHN O. 
HALEY, AUTHORITY WITHOUT POWER: LAW AND THE JAPANESE PARADOX 43 (1991). 
5  For a more detailed account of sixteenth century legislation throughout the country under the so-
called sengoku daimyo, see HALEY, supra note 2, 47-49. 
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European law, 6  the courts construed provisions of the code borrowed 
explicitly from French and even English common law in order to conform to 
conceptual German theory.  Less well-known were the decisions that 
reformulated the newly adopted private law rules of western law favoring 
ownership and individual property rights in ways that protected well-
established community interests.  Not only did the courts reformulate newly 
introduced western law rules arguably to conform to pre-existing norms 
governing community relationships, they also began to create entirely new 
legal institutions to ameliorate the effects of rules related to the ie system 
essentially newly constructed in 1898 in Book Four of the Civil Code.  As 
detailed below, they also began to recognize new forms of secured 
transactions based in part on pre-existing commercial practices. 
C. Taisho and Early Showa Eras—Societal Needs and New Law 
As the Meiji era waned and the Taisho era commenced, Japan’s newly 
established judiciary faced more challenges.  Japan’s political and economic 
reform efforts proved to be dramatically successful.  The goals of 
industrialization and military prowess ushered in an era of world 
recognition.  The defeat of the two neighboring empires first in the 1895 war 
against imperial China and then the war with imperial Russia in 1905 
brought Japan into the club of world powers, theretofore exclusively 
Western.   
With such economic success came social tensions.  As an increasing 
number of absentee landlords began to avoid well-established norms of 
community service, conflicts increased.  As new legal rules that empowered 
individual proprietors and registered heads of households began to be 
exercised, those who were subordinated began to resist.  Industrial pollution 
also began to appear.  In the process, suits were brought and the courts had 
to decide between the enforcement of the new rules or their amelioration.  
Through various devices they began a long process of ameliorating the full 
impact of the rules, limiting newly codified individual rights to deny their 
full, community-disrupting effects. 
                                                      
6  See ZENTARO KITAGAWA, REZEPTION UND FORTBILDUNG DES EUROPÄISCHEN ZIVILRECHTS IN 
JAPAN (1970). For a brief English language account, see Zentaro Kitagawa, Theory Reception: One Aspect 
of the Development of Japanese Civil Law Science, 29 SHIHŌ 251 (1967), translated in 4 L. JAPAN: AN 
ANN. 1 (1970). 
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The role of the courts in response to tenancy and other land-related 
disputes is well known.7  In case after case, decision after decision, the 
courts rejected proprietor and landlord claims that seemed indisputable 
under provisions of the Civil Code and the contested contracts.  The courts 
resorted to various means, beginning with the introduction of the now-
famous reibun doctrine that treated unwanted contract provisions as 
superfluous boilerplate that were construed to reflect the intent of the parties 
and thus had no enforceability.  
 The courts had also begun to recognize the “good faith” and “abuse of 
rights” principles as doctrinal means to avoid the strict application of 
otherwise applicable codified rules in cases in which judges in effect deemed 
pre-existing community interests or simple fairness among the parties to 
override the codified legal rules.  For example, in one of the earliest cases to 
recognize the good faith principle, Mukaiyama v. Yoshikawa8, the Daishin’in 
held that the “good faith” precluded the transfer of property subject to a 
security interest for nonpayment for an “insignificant” shortage. 9   The 
“abuse of rights” doctrine was apparently first applied in a late Meiji Period 
decision in Sonoda v. Sonoda 10 , limiting the “absolute” authority of 
registered household heads to determine the residence of house members.  
Arguably the most notable example of creative judicial law-making 
before World War II was the notion of a naien marriage.  The recognition of 
a naien wife (albeit without the full rights of a legal spouse, especially in 
terms of succession) provided some legal protection to women between the 
time of a formal wedding ceremony and the newly required registration of 
the marriage, with the consent of the household head.  The development 
began with a 1915 decision by the Daishin’in.11  Although recognized in 
subsequent special statutes, such as the 1923 Factory Act, no recognition is 
afforded by Civil Code even as amended pursuant to postwar abolition of the 
ie system and other “democratization” reforms of the Occupation era. 
                                                      
7  See, e.g., Hozumi Tadao,“Hōritsu kōi no ‘kaishaku’ no kōzō to kinō,” [The Structure and 
Function of the ‘Interpretation of Juristic Acts]. This classic study is published in two parts:  77 HŌGAKU 
KYŌKAI ZASSHI 603 (1961); and 78 HŌGAKU KYŌKAI ZASSHI 27 (1961).  Published in English translation 
in:  3 L. JAPAN: AN ANN. 90 (trans. Rex Coleman, 1970); 5 L. JAPAN: AN ANN. 132 (trans. John O. Haley, 
1972). See also John O. Haley, Japan’s New Land and House Lease Law, in LAND ISSUES IN JAPAN: A 
POLICY FAILURE? 149 (John O. Haley & Kozo Yamamura, eds., 1992).  
8  Gr. Ct. Cass. Dec. 18, 1920, 26 MINROKU 1947 (Japan). 
9  For fuller discussion of the case, see JOHN OWEN HALEY, THE SPIRIT OF JAPANESE LAW 162-63 
(1980). 
10  Gr. Ct. Cass., June 20, 1901, 7 MINROKU (No. 6) 47 (Japan). 
11  Gr. Ct. Cass. 1915, 21 MINROKU 49, (Japan). 
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In my view, the judges in these and other cases chose a cautiously 
conservative approach.  Fairness certainly appears to be a motivating factor, 
but what the judges may have considered to be a “just” outcome can be 
viewed as essentially a reaffirmation of traditional communitarian values.  In 
most instances they arguably rejected legal rules that when enforced would 
allow their beneficiaries, whether landlords or household heads, to ignore 
established community norms and collective interests. 
Judicial law-making and innovation did not disrupt commercial 
advances.  In the area of secured transactions, for example, the court began 
to recognize various means of securing loans, more often than not, based on 
traditional practices.  Once again, the court adopted an essentially 
conservative approach and confirmed community. 
D. Postwar “Activism” 
Some may view such law-making by judges in Japan to reflect a 
progressive “activism” at variance with a presumptively more “conservative’ 
societal consensus.  Frank K. Upham, for example, points to postwar judicial 
decisions in employment, divorce, and protection against discrimination as 
examples of  a “‘liberal’ direction” that he views as contrary to the 
“prevailing consensus of Japanese society.”12  I would counter by reiterating 
that, in my view, the examples of judicial law-making Upham discusses are 
more appropriately understood as a product of a communitarian 
conservatism and related concern for consistency, certainty, and consensus.  
My disagreement with Upham’s characterization seems in any event to be 
more a matter of semantics and perspective than substance. 
Decisions that may indeed reflect “progressive” values in the United 
States and Western Europe need to be understood in their Japanese context.  
The outcomes in the Taisho and early Showa era cases were fully compatible 
with increasingly collectivist views that supported the expansion of 
mandatory conciliation in family and tenancy disputes to avoid the 
application of legal rules in the new Civil Code favored by those who sought 
enforcement and more “liberal,” rule-of-law outcomes.13  The cases Upham 
cites may be similarly appraised.  With the notable exception of the 
                                                      
12  Frank K. Upham, Stealth Activism: Norm Formation by Japanese Courts, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 
1493, 1494 (2011). 
13  For a detailed examination of the efforts to substitute formal conciliation (chōtei) for trials (soshō) 
in the late Taisho and early Showa periods, see John Owen Haley, The Politics of Informal Justice: The 
Japanese Experience, 1922-1942, in 2 THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE, COMPARATIVE STUDIES 125-47 
(Richard L. Abel, ed.,1982). 
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decisions related to employment discrimination of women (in which the 
courts applied rules on gender equality that were inserted into the Civil Code 
by Occupation authorities pursuant to new constitutional mandates of article 
24,)14 the cases Upham views as “liberal” involved attempts at unilateral 
termination of on-going relationships in employment or marriage.  Hence 
these cases are best understood, as I have previously argued, as examples of 
a long-standing judicial hostility to unilateral expulsion of a member from a 
community—whether a village, a family, a marriage, a firm, or a tenancy 
relationship—and related affirmation of community consensus and 
cohesion.15 
Similarly, the long line of cases that require cause for termination of 
labor contracts with rejection of “at-will” labor contracts despite language of 
1947 labor statute can be viewed as examples of judicial “activism,” as 
phrased by Dan Foote, but with the aim of social stability rather than 
progressive change16 or perhaps as a manifestation of what in the context of 
criminal law Foote has termed the “benevolent paternalism” of judges as 
well as prosecutors and the police.17 
Although I question the accuracy of the “activism” label, at least, as 
that term is understood in a U.S. context but applied to Japan, few would 
dispute the creativity and legal significance of a vast number of postwar 
decisions in which, as in the Meiji era, the courts sought to define legal rules 
and principles set out in Occupation era statutes borrowed from the United 
States and the new postwar constitution.  The cases involving women’s 
rights under the postwar amendments to the Civil Code, noted by Upham, 
provide excellent examples of judicial enforcement of codified rules.   
But what of judicial law-making?  Several prominent examples stand 
out. The first is in the area of antitrust law.  In 1947, the Diet enacted the so-
called Antimonopoly Law.18  The statute reflects the work of a U.S. lawyer, 
Lester Salwin, who unquestionably combined the substantive prohibitions of 
the U.S. Sherman Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act but without 
                                                      
14  See ALFRED C. OPPLER, LEGAL REFORM IN OCCUPIED JAPAN: A PARTICIPANT LOOKS BACK 111-
20 (1976).  For details on the provisions of Article 24 related to gender equality in the postwar Constitution 
by the woman responsible for their drafting and inclusion, see BEATE SIROTA GORDON, THE ONLY WOMAN 
IN THE ROOM: A MEMOIR (1999). 
15  HALEY, THE SPIRIT OF JAPANESE LAW, supra note 9, at 123-55. 
16  Dan H. Foote, Judicial Creation of Norms in Japanese Labor Law: Activism in the Service of – 
Stability, 43 UCLA L. REV. 635, 642 (1996). 
17  See Dan H. Foote, The Benevolent Paternalism of Japanese Criminal Justice, 80 CAL. L. REV. 317 
(1992). 
18  Shiteki dokusen no kinshi oyobi kōsei torihiki ni kansuru hōritsu [Formally, the Law Concerning 
the Prohibition of Private Monopolies and the Preservation of Fair Trade], Law No. 54 of 1947. 
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the dual enforcement features of U.S. law divided between the Department 
of Justice under the Sherman Act and the Federal Trade Commission 
(“FTC”) under the FTC Act.  A key provision in the Japanese statute is 
Article 19, which prohibits, as amended, “unfair business practices” but a 
violation of which does not incur criminal sanctions as provided for 
violations of the two other substantive prohibitions of Article 3 (“private 
monopolization” and unreasonable restraints of trade).  The provisions of 
Article 19 and Article 3 track the prohibitions of the two U.S. statutes.  
Inasmuch as the FTC does not have criminal enforcement authority, the 
prohibition of “unfair methods of completion,” in the FTC Act, the source of 
Article 19, does not carry criminal penalties.   
This makes some sense inasmuch as “unfair methods of competition” 
also covers conduct prohibited (and criminalized) in the Sherman Act.  The 
apparent anomaly of the combination of these prohibitions in the Japanese 
statute was, however, very early and creatively resolved by the courts.  In 
1953, in the Asahi Newspaper case,19 the Tokyo High Court construed the 
Article 19 prohibition of “unfair business practices” (without criminal 
penalty) to apply solely to vertical restraints of trade thereby excluding all 
horizontal restraints among competitors, which was covered (and 
criminalized) in Article 3.20 
In company law, another piece of Occupation law reform for which 
Lester Salwin was again initially responsible,21 Dan Puchniak and Masafumi 
Nakahigashi point out a more recent example of judicial creativity.  Early 
critics of the introduction of U.S. (Illinois) company law in Japan noted the 
lack of a “supporting body of … flexible case law” to guide judges in 
interpreting newly provided rules on shareholder rights and remedies.22  At 
least today, U.S. case law seems to provide some guidance.  In a recently 
published Festschrift honoring Harald Baum, Puchniak and Nakahigashi 
                                                      
19  Tōkyō Kōtō Saibansho [Tokyo High Ct.] Mar. 9, 1953, 4 KŌSEI TORIHIKI I’INKAI SHINKETSUSHŪ 
145 (Japan). 
20   See John O. Haley, Marketing and Antitrust in Japan, 2 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 51, 53 
(1979).  For fuller discussion of the development of competition law in Japan and other leading cases, see 
JOHN O. HALEY, ANTITRUST IN GERMANY AND JAPAN: THE FIRST FIFTY-YEARS, 1947-1998 (2001). 
21  See Lester N. Salwin, The New Commercial Code of Japan: Symbol of Gradual Progress Toward 
Democratic Goals, 50 GEO. L.J. 478 (1962). 
22  See Thomas L. Blakemore & Makoto Yazawa, Japanese Commercial Code Revisions, 2 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 12, 23 (1954). 
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comment on a 2010 Supreme Court decision23 that creatively introduced the 
business judgment rule in shareholder derivative actions.24 
In one area of law at least, prewar precedents have prevailed in the 
face of Occupation reforms.  Despite the constitutional abolition of the 
Administrative Court and the related prewar limitations on judicial review, 
the newly established Supreme Court early confirmed the continued efficacy 
of a narrow construction of the administrative actions under the German-
based, prewar notion of “administrative acts” as the only reviewable form of 
administrative action.25  The case continues to be the ruling precedent.26  
In no area of law have the courts been more cautious and conservative 
than in the area of constitutional law.  Yet the role of the courts remains the 
same.  They have continued to develop bedrock rules and principles for 
governance and citizen rights.  Two examples stand out. The first relates to 
Article 9.  The 1959 decision in Sakata v. Japan,27 better known as the 
Sunakawa case, remains the controlling precedent.  In that case the Court 
held that the political branch had the authority to determine the scope of the 
prohibitions of Article 9 unless the action in question presented a manifest 
violation of the provision.  It has remained the controlling precedent for over 
a half century.   
The malapportionment cases similarly illustrate tensions between 
deference to precedent as well as the political branch and the constitutional 
mandates of political equality.  The 1964 Grand Bench decision in 
Koshiyama v. Chairman, Tokyo Metropolitan Election Supervision 
Commission28 is the landmark precedent.  For the first time the Court held 
that the issue of apportionment for, in this case, House of Councillors 
elections was justiciable but affirmed that the alleged malapportionment of 
voters in urban versus rural districts was not so egregious to constitute a 
violation of the constitutional guarantee of equality under Article 14(1) and 
other provisions of the postwar constitution.  Subsequent decisions, 
beginning with  the 1976 Kurokawa case,29 in which the Court has held 
House of Representatives’ districting to be unconstitutional, neither 
                                                      
23  The Apamanshop case, HANREI TAIMUZU (No. 2010) 50 (2010), see also 
http://www.courts.go.jp/hanrei/pdf/20100715143943.pdf. 
24  Dan W. Puchniak & Masafumi Nakahigashi, Case No. 21, Comment, in BUSINESS LAW IN 
JAPAN—CASES AND COMMENTS 215, 215 (Moritz Bälz et al, eds., 2012). 
25  Sup. Ct., G.B. 1961,15 MINSHŪ 467 (Japan). 
26  See cases and discussion in John O. Haley, Japanese Administrative Law: An Introduction, 19 L. 
JAPAN: AN ANN. 9 (1986). 
27  Sup. Ct., G.B. 1959, 13 KEISHŪ 3225 (Japan). 
28  Sup. Ct., G.B.1964, 18 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI KANKETSUSHŪ [MINSHŪ] 270 (Japan).  
29  Sup. Ct., G.B. 1976, 30 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI KANKETSUSHŪ [MINSHŪ] 223 (Japan). 
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overruled nor distinguished the 1964 precedent.  The Koshiyama case has 
thus defined the issue as a question of the extent of imbalance based on the 
comparative ratio of voters per representative or councilor in contested 
districts.  
III. ROLE OF PRECEDENT  
Precedent matters.  Putting aside the role of civil codes and well-
established scholarly commentary, rather than judicial decisions as 
foundational sources for private law rules and principles in civil law 
jurisdictions, the role of precedent in Japan seems as firmly fixed as in the 
United States and other common law systems.  Instances in which the 
Supreme Court has overruled prior decisions are rare, even decisions by its 
prewar predecessor, the Daishin’in.  In nearly every field of law, we can 
identify long-standing precedents that continue to be followed. 
In criminal law, for example, in 1958 the Supreme Court followed two 
cases from the 1930s holding that the defendant’s omission to extinguish a 
fire caused by his fault with the intent to allow the building to burn 
constituted the crime of arson. 30   In the first case, a 1932 Daishin’in 
decision, the Court had held that a son engaged in life-and-death struggle 
with his adoptive father was guilty of the crime of setting fire to an inhabited 
building (CC art. 108) for failing to put out a fire caused by burning wood 
the father had thrown at him.31  In the second case, decided six years later in 
1938, the Court had held that at the failure to extinguish a fallen candle that 
caused a fire that burned down a house constituted the crime of arson 
because of the candle had been lit by the defendant.32  Such cases may seem 
relatively minor and narrowly decided, gap-filling decisions, but they 
exemplify the continued validity of much court-made, prewar criminal law 
jurisprudence. 
The case that in my view best illustrates the deference to precedent is 
the Supreme Court’s 1975 decision in Sumiyoshi v. Governor of Hiroshima 
Prefecture, 33  in which the court held a licensing standard restricting the 
location of pharmacies to avoid competition to be an unwarranted  
                                                      
30  Gr. Ct. Cass. 1958, 12 KEISHŪ 2882 (Japan). 
31  Gr. Ct. Cass. 1932, 24 Keiroku 1558 (Japan). 
32  Gr. Ct. Cass. 1938, 17  DAIHAN KEISHŪ 237 (Japan). 
33  Sup. Ct., G.B. Apr. 30, 1975, 29 MINSHŪ 4 (Japan). For an English language translation, see 
LAWRENCE W. BEER AND HIROSHI ITOH, THE CONSTITUTIONAL CASE LAW OF JAPAN, 1970 THROUGH 1990, 
188-99 (1996).  For my comment, see John O. Haley, The Freedom to Choose an Occupation and the 
Constitutional Limit of Legislative Discretion—K.K. Sumiyoshi  v. Governor of Hiroshima Prefecture, 8 L. 
JAPAN: AN ANN. 178 (1976). 
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infringement of the freedom of occupation under Article 22 of the 
constitution.  The Court refrained, however, from overruling the otherwise 
controlling precedent in Shimizu v. Japan34 (better known as the Fukuoka 
Bathhouse case).  On the facts, the cases are nearly identical except for the 
businesses involved and the fact that the Bathhouse case was a criminal 
action. 
A telling example of the rare instance in which the Court has 
overruled precedent is the Supreme Court’s 1973 decision in Aizawa v. 
Japan. 35   In that decision, the Court declared unconstitutional on equal 
protection grounds the provisions of Article 200 of the Criminal Code that 
imposed a more severe penalty for murder of a lineal ascendant than for any 
other murders.  The decision explicitly overturned a 1950 Grand Bench case 
that, although criticizing the greater severity of the punishment for murder of 
lineal ascendants under article 200, nevertheless refused to hold it to be 
unconstitutional. 36   The 1973 decision left standing, however, a 1949 
decision in which the Court had affirmed the constitutionality of a similar 
Criminal Code provision in article 205 that imposed a greater penalty for the 
crime of causing death by physical injury to a lineal ascendant than to 
others.37 
The reluctance to alter or overrule prior cases reflects, in my view, the 
deeply ingrained values and habits of common conservative inclinations, 
with emphasis on consistency, certainty, and consensus along with an 
equally conservative and overriding deference to the contributions of their 
predecessors, judges of the past.  
IV. LEGISLATIVE AFFIRMATION OF JUDICIAL PRECEDENT 
No feature of Japanese law has been more distinctive than the pattern 
of subsequent legislative action affirming judicial precedent, in many 
instances years later.  Among the best known examples was the inclusion of 
the “good faith” and “abuse of rights” principles in the postwar amendments 
to article 1 of the Civil Code.  Legislative recognition, albeit with 
                                                      
34  Sup. Ct., G.B. 1955, 9 KEISHŪ 89 (Japan) (translated by Masaaki Ikeda in JOHN M. MAKI, COURT 
AND CONSTITUTION IN JAPAN: SELECTED SUPREME COURT DECISIONS, 1948-60 293 (1964). 
35  Sup.Ct., G.B. Apr. 4, 1973, 27 KEISHŪ 265 (Japan). For an English translation, see BEER AND 
ITOH, THE CONSTITUTIONAL CASE LAW OF JAPAN, 143 (1996).. 
36  See Sup. Ct., G.B. 1949, 4 KEISHŪ 10 (Japan). 
37  Sup. Ct. 1950, 4 KEISHŪ 2037 (Japan).  For English translation, see KURT STEINER, MAKI, COURT 
AND CONSTITUTION IN JAPAN 129 (1964).  The contested sections of article 205 remained effective if not 
often enforced until fully removed along with repeal of article 200 by the Diet under Law No.91, 1995, 
although previously modified by Law No. 156, 1989.  
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modification of the prewar judicial precedents related to land and house 
leases described above, are early examples.  The 1921 Land Lease Law38 and 
House Lease Law,39 not to mention the 1900 Law Concerning Superficies40 
and the 1909 Law Concerning the Protection of Buildings, 41  may be 
somewhat exceptional in that they appear to reflect a common legislative 
concern to supplant judicial activity as soon as possible and thereby, 
arguably, reduce judicial innovation, or at least to avoid inconsistency and 
the tensions between codified and judge-made rules.  In two areas that have 
been central to both my earliest and most recent research,42 however, as 
described below, the pattern of full legislative recognition is evident.  
In the case of non-code security interests, statutory affirmation came 
many decades later.  A 1902 Daishin’in decision first recognized 
(neteitōken)–translated variously into English as “base,” “root,” or 
“maximal” hypothecs.43  Not until 1971 was the Civil Code amended to 
provide for this flexible form of hypothec.44  Similarly, other forms of non-
possessory security interests in movable as well as immovable property 
recognized by judicial decision decades before any statutory provision.  In 
1906, the Court recognized contractual jōtō tampo arrangements as 
legitimate and effective secured transactions.45  It took nearly eight decades 
for the Diet to enact a statute recognizing such by then commonly used, 
convenient forms of secured transactions in registered collateral, particularly 
immovables.46  The most recent example is the 2011 amendment of the Code 
of Civil Procedure on international adjudicatory jurisdiction. 47   The 
amendment notably made little if any change in the rules and standards 
developed by the courts during the preceding half century, including the 
landmark 1981 Supreme Court decision in Goto v. Malaysian Airlines.48  The 
amendments in language and effect essentially legislatively confirmed 
existing judicial approaches and precedents including, in Article 3-9, a 
                                                      
38  Shakuchi hō, Law No. 49 of 1921 (Japan). 
39  Shakuya hō, Law No. 50 of 1921 (Japan). 
40  Chijōken ni kansura hōritsu, Law No. 72 of 1900 (Japan). 
41  Tatemono hogo ni kansura hōritsu, Law No. 40 of 1909 (Japan). 
42  See JOHN O. HALEY, FUNDAMENTALS OF TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION: THE UNITED STATES, 
CANADA, JAPAN, AND THE EUROPEAN UNION (2012). 
43 Gr. Ct. Cass. 1902, 8 MINROKU 72 (Japan).  
44 1971, no. 99, adding Civil Code articles 398-2 through 398-22. 
45  Gr. Ct., Cass. 1906, 12 MINROKU 1172 (Japan). 
46  Kari-tōki tanpo keiyaku ni kansuru hōritsu [Law concerning Provisional Registration Security 
Interest Contracts] Law No. 78, 1978 (Japan). 
47  Law, adding Code of Civil Procedure Articles 3-2 through 3-12, enacted on April 28, 2011 and 
promulgated on May 2, 2011, effective in 2012. 
48  Sup. Ct., 2nd P.B. Oct. 16, 1981, no. 7, 35 MINSHŪ 1224 (Japan). 
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provision for dismissal of actions on the basis of the principles of jōri, 
thereby effectively affirming the 1986 Tokyo District Court decision in 
Mukoda v. The Boeing Co.49 
That legislators may to some degree at least share conservative 
attributes of the judiciary may help to explain this remarkable deference to 
the judiciary and judicial law-making.  However, I suspect this pattern of 
legislative affirmation of judicial decisions is better explained by an 
imbedded emphasis on consensus as a societal value as well as product of 
structural political configurations.  The need for consensus in the face of 
disagreement over the appropriate direction of the law arguably precludes 
any significant change in a status-quo that has been determined by the 
courts.  The consequence is ultimate legislative acquiescence in the role of 
judges in the law-making process.  
 
                                                      
49  Tokyo Dist. Ct. June 20, 1986, HANREI TIMES (No. 604) 138 (Japan). 
